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Avoiding the Tragedy of Frankenstein:
The Application of the Right of
Publicity to the Use of Digitally
Reproduced Actors in Film
by
ERiN GIACOPPO*
We're about to unfold the story of Frankenstein. A man of science
who sought to create a man after his own image, without reckoning
upon God. It is one of the strangest tales ever told. It deals with
the two great mysteries of creation: Life and Death. I think it will
thrill you. It may shock you. It might even horrify you.
-Opening Narration, "Frankenstein"'l
Introduction
The 1931 movie "Frankenstein" depicts a man who is obsessed by
the desire to create life. The scientist fashioned a body from the re-
mains of corpses not long dead.2 His laboratory consisted of an oper-
ating table, surgical instruments and electrical gadgetry that
summoned the power of an electrical storm.3 His goal to create life
succeeded, but the result was a Pandora's box of unexpected
disasters.4
Today there are modem scientists who can be analogized to the
well-meaning Dr. Frankenstein. They seek to create, not life, but the
illusion of life, by digitally replicating living actors and digitally resur-
recting deceased personalities.5 In their laboratories lie powerful
** J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 1997; B.A., Arizona State Univer-
sity, 1987. I am grateful to my husband Paul, whose career as a motion picture special
effects artist inspired me to write about digital actors and the right of publicity. Paul's love
and constant support bring meaning to all of my endeavors.
1. FRANKENSTEIN (Universal Pictures 1931).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. Although intended for good, Dr. Frankenstein's creation of life ironically resulted
in the loss of life and damaged reputations. See id.
5. For the purposes of this Note, a "replicated actor" is a computer-generated ver-
sion of a living actor; a "resurrected actor" is a computer-generated version of a deceased
actor.
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Silicon Graphics computers, fully equipped with the latest modeling
and animation software, three-dimensional scanners, and motion-cap-
ture technology.6 Photos and film footage of the deceased person,
sample hair and clothing textures, and voice tracks of the late actor fill
the lab.7 Although it may sound far-fetched, this scenario is already
underway at various special effects companies and research laborato-
ries around the world.8 Visual Effects Supervisor Steve Williams, of
the special effects company Industrial Light & Magic, predicts that in
the near future "[1]ong dead Presidents will be on TV, computer-gen-
erated, giving speeches. Actors who died 50 years ago will be starring
next to contemporary actors. We could even create actors who have
never been born-guys you don't have to pay points or give trailers
to. It will happen."9
Computer technology presents exciting and innovative possibili-
ties. Digital magic could bring endless opportunities for scientific re-
search and creative expression. While these are worthy pursuits, these
endeavors raise questions. Should filmmakers be allowed to replicate
living actors without the actor's permission? Should deceased celebri-
ties be digitally resurrected without compensating their estates? Such
futuristic potential presents ethical, moral, and legal dilemmas.
The process of digitally replicating and resurrecting actors brings
First Amendment 0 freedom of expression into conflict with the right
of publicity.1 The First Amendment encourages artistic expression
and public comment12 while the right of publicity establishes that
"every person [can] control the commercial use of his or her iden-
6. Interview with Paul Giacoppo, Senior Model Supervisor, Industrial Light &
Magic, in San Rafael, Cal. (Feb. 25, 1996) (describing the office of a typical computer artist
at Industrial Light & Magic, one of the nation's leading special effects companies) [herein-
after Giacoppo Interview]. For a discussion of digital techniques such as "motion capture"
see Parts L.A & I.B of this note.
7. Giacoppo Interview, supra note 6.
8. See Part .C of this Note for a discussion of some recent attempts to digitally
reproduce human characters.
9. Richard Corliss, They Put the ILM in Film; At George Lucas' Oscar-hoarding In-
dustrial Light & Magic, computer wizards are re-forming the face of movies, TiME, Apr. 13,
1992, at 68.
10. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. See Parts III and IV of this Note for a discussion of the right of publicity and how
it conflicts with freedom of speech.
12. See Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959,969 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that parody baseball trading cards did not infringe on baseball players' right
of publicity because the First Amendment protects "[s]peech that entertains, like speech
that informs ... because 'the line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive
for the protection of that basic right."' (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948))).
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tity."'1 3 When an artist utilizes a celebrity's identity for commercial
purposes without permission, he violates the celebrity's right of
publicity.14
The right of publicity originated at common law and is codified in
several states. For example, in California the statutory right of public-
ity protects a celebrity's "name, voice, signature, photograph, or like-
ness" 5 from commercial use without the celebrity's permission.
Because Hollywood is the hotbed of the entertainment industry, Cali-
fornia's right of publicity statute is pivotal to the development of pub-
licity rights throughout the nation. Other states will look to California
for guidance in developing right of publicity statutes that protect ce-
lebrities in light of new technology.
The digital creation of actors will likely spark right of publicity
claims from living actors who are replicated and used in commercials
or movies without their consent. Moreover, the resurrection of de-
ceased actors is sure to bring claims from heirs,' 6 some of whom may
not approve of the use of their deceased family member in a modern
movie. Others may want control of the context in which the actor is
presented to the modern public.17 All heirs will likely want to be com-
pensated for the use of the late actor's likeness.' 8 Although the pro-
cess of digitally creating actors is not yet seamless, the technology is
just a few years off.19 Therefore, the California Legislature should be
proactive in developing legislation, anticipating this soon-to-be reality
and providing guidance to special effects companies, actors, and de-
ceased actors' families.
Part I of this Note discusses recent developments in special ef-
fects for film and explains the various processes for creating digital
characters. It also predicts the likelihood of digitally replicating living
actors and digitally resurrecting deceased personalities. Part II points
out the potential areas of exploitation regarding the use of the digital
actor and suggests that the right of publicity provide protection to the
13. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture-The
Human Persona As Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 129, 130 (1995) (discussing the difference between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment and noting that some people criticize the right of publicity as a threat to
freedom of speech).
14. See id
15. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting the appropriation of a
person's identity without his or her consent for use in a commercial context); see also Part
II.B of this note.
16. See Part III.B.
17. See Part III.C for a discussion of the reasons an estate may want control over the
use of a deceased relative in film.
18. See Part II.C for a treatment of the economic impact free digital resurrection may
have on the acting profession.
19. See infra Part I.C.
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actor. This section also explains the evolution of the right of publicity
at common law and discusses California's statutory provisions. To il-
lustrate the growing recognition and protection of the right of public-
ity, Part II explores current case law. Part III analyzes the impact of
California law on the creation and use of replicated and resurrected
actors. It advocates the application of the right of publicity to the use
of resurrected actors in film. Part IV proposes an exception to Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 990(n) that exempts the use of a deceased
person's likeness from the right of publicity when used in film and
television programs.
I. Digital Technology
A. Recent Developments in Special Effects for Film
To appreciate digital technological advances, a review of some re-
cent developments in the special effects industry is helpful. The Os-
car-winning special effects company Industrial Light & Magic (ILM)
has made numerous advances in the area of digital characters. One of
the first memorable appearances of a digital character was in "The
Abyss," where a "pseudopod," made entirely of seawater, believably
mimicked actor Mary Elizabeth Mastrontonio's facial expressions.20
In "Terminator 2," the shape-shifting "T-1000" character digitally as-
sumed various humanoid forms. 21
The technology took another leap forward with ILM's creation of
the 3-D dinosaurs in "Jurassic Park." For the first time, computer art-
ists played a dominant part in creating living, breathing, life-like
movie characters.22 The creation of computer-generated hair and skin
textures on the animals in "Jumanji" brought computer artists one
step closer to realism.23 The movie "Dragonheart" featured the first
realistic computer-generated character to perform in a starring role.24
The dragon demonstrates a full range of emotional expression in-
spired by actor Sean Connery, who provides the dragon's voice.25
20. See Bill Rodriguez, Approaching Pixel Perfect: They've done it with dinosaurs and
toys, but can computers now simulate a human being?, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 8, 1995, at
C1.
21. See David Einstein, Computers Transform Tinseltown, S.F. CHRON., May 8, 1995,
at B1.
22. See Rodriguez, supra note 20, at C1.
23. See Michael Saunders, 'Toy Story,' 'Jumanji' delight techies, BOsTON GLOBE, Jan.
6, 1996, at 21.
24. See Tom Green, Breathing life into movie dragon, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 1996, at
D1.
25. See id.
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Finally, producer/director George Lucas used computer graphics
imaging to digitally resurrect a fictional character.26 In his 1983 film
"Return of the Jedi," Lucas relied on animatronic puppetry to create
the character "Jabba the Hutt," a slug-like alien gangster. 27 When Lu-
cas decided to release an enhanced version of his well-known film
"Star Wars" in 1997, he wanted to include Jabba, who was not part of
the original film when it was released in 1977.28 Although the Jabba
puppet had been destroyed after "Return of the Jedi," ILM's com-
puter animators digitally resurrected Jabba for the release of "Star
Wars-Special Edition. '29
B. Digital Character Creation
The creation of digital characters currently falls into two catego-
ries: two-dimensional ("2-D") and three dimensional ("3-D").30 The
2-D technique commonly involves the digital manipulation of existing
photographs or film footage.31 These images are first scanned into a
computer, then altered through the use of image-warping or "morph-
ing" technologies. 32 While this technique has limitations, it was used
effectively in the popular film "Forrest Gump" to manipulate footage
of John F. Kennedy, making him appear to say and do things he never
did.3 3
By contrast, the 3-D process entails creating an entire three-di-
mensional replica of a celebrity that exists only inside the computer.3 4
The computer artist begins by scanning either a sculpted model of the
actor or the actual actor's face and body.35 This process converts the
physical form of the actor into a 3-D digital representation inside the
computer.36
After the digital model is complete, a computer animator creates
a virtual skeleton inside the model that is used to animate the body
26. See Mark Cotta Vaz, Blast to the Past, THE STAR WARS 20mH ANNIVERSARY COM-
MEMORATIrE MAGAZINE, 1997, at 40.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id
30. See Valerie Hall, Morphing in 2-D and 3-D, DR. Dorm's J. OF SOFTWARE TooLs,
July 1993, at 18 (discussing the process of morphing using a 2-D image or a 3-D model).
31. See Janice Hubbard, Commercial Spot: Reflections of the Dead, CINEFEX, May
1992, at 82.
32. See Hall, supra note 30, at 18.
33. See Einstein, supra note 21, at B1.
34. Giacoppo Interview, supra note 6.
35. See Stephen Porter, Made for the stage: synthetic actors are getting better; three-
dimensional computer animation of human or human-like images, COMPUTER GRAPHICS
WORLD, Aug. 1990, at 60.
36. See id.
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positions of the character.3 7 Facial expressions can be animated by
blending sculpted facial poses over time to create the appearance that
the character is speaking or emoting.38 Piece by piece, the character is
made to move until it develops realistic expressions and manner-
isms.39 Animation can also be accomplished through a process called
motion capture, which involves placing sensors on a performer.40 As
the performer moves, the generated motion is transferred to the com-
puter-modeled human, giving the digital character extremely life-like
and subtle movements.41
The final touches are then added in the rendering phase.42 First,
color and texture are "painted" onto the character by computer art-
ists.4 3 Fine details such as complexion, pores, eye coloration, and even
skin imperfections are added.44 Advances in technology allow the cre-
ation of realistic hair and clothing, which until recently proved prob-
lematic in digital imagery.45 Finally, the artist places the character
into the scene, lit by virtual lights, and the computer painstakingly
"renders" frame after frame.46 A technical director then outputs the
images to traditional film stock.47
To provide a voice for the character, several techniques are avail-
able. Creating an entirely computer-generated voice is difficult but
offers the most versatile performance. 48 A more limited approach in-
volves editing recordings of the original actor's voice and restringing
words and phonemes together to create new phrases and sentences. 49
The most traditional method is simply to hire a "soundalike" or im-
pressionist to provide the necessary dialogue.5 0
37. Giacoppo Interview, supra note 6.
38. See Porter, supra note 35, at 60 ("[A]n animator starts with a source expression
and a target expression (acquired from a facial expression library or by digitizing a series of
clay models) and then uses the computer to create the in-between frames that take the face
from one expression to the next.").
39. See Porter, supra note 35, at 60.
40. See id.
41. See id. (discussing the use of motion-capture to animate a character in the movie
"RoboCop").
42. See STEvE UPSTILL, THE RENDERMAN COMPANION 435 (1990) (defining "render-
ing" as "[tihe process of generating a synthetic image of a scene given a precise description
of the geometry and other characteristics of the scene").
43. Interview with James R. Tooley, Senior Technical Director and Animator, Indus-
trial Light & Magic, in San Rafael, Cal. (Feb. 23, 1996).
44. See id
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
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C. Computer-Generated Actors
How close are computer scientists and artists to actually repli-
cating human actors? Presently, time and money pose difficulties.51
As computer technology continues to develop, however, the time and
costs of creating human actors will decrease.5 2 "[M]ost experts agree
that someday (be it five years from now or 20 years from now) it prob-
ably will be possible to create a truly realistic-looking animated
human."53
Although computer artists have not yet been able to realistically
replicate a human actor to seamless perfection, they have made signif-
icant progress. For instance, "[a] silicon actor named Ray Tracy, cre-
ated by Digital Vision Entertainment in Los Angeles, w[as] the cohost
of Computer Visions, a PBS documentary special. '54 Producers of
"The Crow" completed the movie despite the death of actor Brandon
Lee during the filming, "because digital glimpses of Brandon Lee...
could be inserted in scenes yet to be shot."55 Digital artists altered
archival footage of personalities Humphrey Bogart, James Cagney
and Louis Armstrong to interact with modem celebrities such as El-
ton John in a series of Diet Coke commercials.5 6
Moreover, at the 1995 SIGGRAPH computer graphics
tradeshow, a Montreal computer-graphics designer unveiled his film
"The Boxer," which starred computer-generated characters complete
with realistic skin, hair, draped clothing, and sweat.5 7 In 1987, Swiss
scientists Daniel and Nadia M. Thalmann created a "seven-minute
film, 'Rendezvous A Montreal,' featuring Humphrey Bogart and
Marilyn Monroe-the first computer-synthesized performances by
dead actors. 58 Although the actors were noticeably computer-gener-
ated, the scientists captured the essence of the actors' unique manner-
isms. 59 These scientists believe that, although "[i]t will be difficult to
do a film with a lot of action," they will soon be able to successfully
51. See Saunders, supra note 23, at C1.
52. See Bruce Weber, Why Marilyn and Bogie Still Need a Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 1994, at B18 (quoting Jim Morris, President of Lucas Digital Ltd., who explains that
costs will decrease over time and comments that it is possible to replicate human actors
right now, but that it is very expensive).
53. Porter, supra note 35, at 60.
54. Kathleen K. Wiegner & Julie Schlax, But can she act?, FORBES, Dec. 10, 1990, at
274.
55. Rodriguez, supra note 20, at C1.
56. See Hubbard, supra note 31, at 82.
57. See Rodriguez, supra note 20, at C1 (noting that the character's "movements in
just those few seconds-micro-motions of the lips, arms swinging down naturally-are an
achievement").
58. Weber, supra note 52, at B18.
59. See id
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produce "a film within a limited environment. ' 60 The scientists are
currently digitally resurrecting James Dean.61
James Lima, director of imaging for Steven Spielberg's Amblin
Entertainment, envisions "Christian Slater and Kevin Costner in a
western, being approached by John Wayne. What an amazing scene
that would be!"62 While deceased actors are attractive targets for res-
urrection through computer animation, living actors will likely be rep-
licated as well. In anticipation of convincing replication technology,
Marlon Brando and several other celebrities have had their faces digi-
tally scanned and stored for future use.63 With such capabilities at the
entertainment industry's doorstep, now is the time to address the legal
issues that actor replication and resurrection raise. Therefore, the
California Legislature should enact legislation that will anticipate the
right of publicity questions that digital replication and resurrection
pose.
H. Exploitation Issues Regarding the Creation and Use of
Digital Actors and the Right of Publicity
As digital actors become indistinguishable from footage of real
persons, film producers and advertisers will likely want to use repli-
cated and resurrected actors in their work. Right-of-publicity laws
may provide some guidance. However, it is unclear how the right, as
it stands today, will apply to the actor who is reproduced digitally.
This uncertainty may leave an open door for producers or advertisers
to use the digital actor for personal financial gain without compensat-
ing or obtaining permission from the real actor or his estate.64
While the thought of long-dead actors such as Humphrey Bogart
and Gretta Garbo "performing" on the screen again is exciting, this
excitement fades when one considers the potential for abuse. Garbo,
for example, could be cast in a "Fatal Attraction"-type movie, com-
plete with nude love scenes. Bogart's timeless face could be used to
implore us to buy used autos. Thus, with the power to resurrect an
actor's image comes the potential to lessen or cheapen his
reputation. 65
60. Id
61. See iL
62. Id.
63. See Bill Rodriguez, Animating humans a tough chore, THE NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 5, 1995, at E7.
64. See Part III.C.
65. See Part III.C.
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This potential raises questions of defamation and invasion of pri-
vacy, which are distinct causes of action from the right of publicity.66
Defamation, which consists of libel and slander, gives a plaintiff re-
course if he is falsely defamed in a broadcast, performance or publica-
tion.67 The right of privacy also protects a person's reputation. Dean
Prosser divides the right of privacy into four distinct claims: false light
invasion of privacy, public disclosure of private facts, unreasonable in-
trusion, and appropriation.68 The first three privacy claims, like defa-
mation, protect a person from presentation to the public in an
offensive and/or false context.69 Only appropriation protects a per-
son's name or likeness from unauthorized use for commercial gain.70
What Prosser called the appropriation claim has evolved into the dis-
tinct right of publicity.7 1 Thus, while defamation and right of privacy
claims may protect the reputation of a digitally created actor, these
rights do not protect a celebrity's identity from unauthorized use for
economic gain.
Moreover, although defamation and right of privacy claims may
aid the living actor who is replicated and cast in a defaming context,72
these claims will not help the estate of the deceased. The personal
rights that defamation and privacy are designed to protect terminate
upon death.73 This leaves the heirs of a defamed actor without re-
course, unless they can prove that the portrayal caused them personal
harm.74 The right of publicity, on the other hand, is descendible in
several states,75 and it is the best legal right to protect deceased actors
66. A developed treatment of defamation and right of privacy claims is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a thoughtful discussion of the impact of 2-D digital technology on
defamation and libel see Lisa Byrne Anastasio Potter, Note, Altered Realities: The Effect of
Digital Imaging Technology on Libel and Right of Privacy, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
LU. 495 (1995).
67. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 797-98 (5th ed.
1984).
68. See id. at 851-66.
69. See id. at 851. Although all of these claims protect a person's reputation, each
requires a plaintiff to prove different elements. For example, false light invasion of privacy
requires that "(1) the material is false, (2) that it was published or made known to others,
and (3) that it is highly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities." Potter, supra note
66, at 510 (citing Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, False Light Invasion of Privacy-
Cognizability and Elements, 57 A.L.R. 4th 22 (1991)).
70. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 401-02 (1960).
71. See infra note 76 and Part II.A.
72. To prevail on a libel claim, the living actor would need to show that the motion
picture portrayal was false and defaming, and that he experienced harm as a result. See
KEETON EF AL., supra note 67.
73. T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE
203 (1981).
74. Id. (noting that "one can publish defamatory statements about deceased individu-
als with impunity unless the same statement also defames people who are still alive").
75. Id.
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from exploitation. To illustrate the scope of this unique right, this sec-
tion will review the common law right of publicity, California publicity
statutes and current right of publicity cases.
A. The Common Law Right of Publicity
The right of publicity finds its origin in the common law right to
privacy.76 It was first discussed in an 1890 Harvard Law Review arti-
cle entitled The Right to Privacy, where Samuel Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis advocated the "right to an 'inviolate personality' that would
protect 'thoughts, emotions, and sensations ... whether expressed in
writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in facial
expression.' "77
There are two types of right of publicity cases: those involving
the plaintiff's identification value and those involving performance
value.78 Courts first recognized identification value as a celebrity's
right of publicity. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum,7 9 the Second Circuit stated:
This right might be called "a right of publicity." For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public expo-
sure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer
received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains
and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant
which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.80
Thus, Haelan Laboratories recognized the right of publicity as
distinct and separate from the right of privacy. The common law right
of publicity makes it illegal for an advertising agency, company or in-
dividual to use a person's identity-name, photo, or voice-to sell a
product without that person's permission.81 California followed this
common law jurisprudence when it adopted its current right of public-
76. DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER & JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CONSnTUTIONAL
RIGHT 75 (1992).
77. Id. (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890)).
78. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture-The Human
Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
129, 133 (1995) (explaining the current state of the right of publicity). McCarthy points out
that "performance value cases are rare" and "[b]y far the most common situation is use of
persona for identification values." Id.
79. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cer denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953) (recognizing a celeb-
rity's right of publicity in the Second Circuit).
80. Id. at 868.
81. See McCarthy, supra note 78, at 130.
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ity statutes in the 1970s and 1980s, 82 which encompass protection for a
celebrity's identity.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a person's
right of publicity for performance value in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.83 In Zacchini, where the defendant broadcasting
company filmed the plaintiff's human cannonball performance and
aired the event on the news, the Court held that the broadcasting
company infringed the plaintiff's right of publicity.84 The Court rea-
soned that "if the public can see the act free on television, it will be
less willing to pay to see it at the fair."'85 "The broadcast of a film of
petitioner's entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value
of that performance. '8 6 The court distinguished performance value
cases from those of identification value, noting that performance
value cases address a plaintiff's ability to make a living from his per-
formances while identification value cases deal with unauthorized use
of a plaintiff's identity to sell a product.87 "[T]he broadcast of peti-
tioner's entire performance, unlike the unauthorized use of another's
name for purposes of trade or the incidental use of a name or picture
by the press, goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as
an entertainer."8
Thus, in both identification and performance value cases, "[t]he
term 'right of publicity' has.., come to signify the right of an individ-
ual, especially a public figure or celebrity, to control the commercial
value and exploitation of his name and picture or likeness and to pre-
vent others from unfairly appropriating this value for their commer-
cial benefit."89
Moreover, to prove an identification value claim the plaintiff
must show that his name, likeness, or voice was used without his con-
sent to sell a product.9° A successful claim proves that the plaintiff is
readily identifiable as himself, and therefore the value of his identity
was appropriated by another.91 In performance value cases a plaintiff
82. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3344 (West Supp. 1997) (originally enacted in 1971 as Cal.
Stats. 1971, c. 1595, p. 3426, § 1); CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1997) (originally
enacted as Cal. Stats. 1984, c. 1704, § 1).
83. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
84. Id. at 563-64, 576.
85. Id. at 575.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 576.
88. Id.
89. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.NJ. 1981) (enjoining de-
fendant's simulation of an Elvis Presley concert because it would likely violate the estate's
right of publicity). See text accompanying notes 14043.
90. See McCarthy, supra note 78, at 134-35.
91. Id.
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must show that the defendant exploited his performance for financial
gain.92
The right of publicity is not, however, without limitations. The
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of speech
and creative expression in order to limit censorship, to provide an
uninhibited outlet for news reporting, and to encourage artistic contri-
butions to society.93 Therefore, a person may not use the right of pub-
licity to claim identification value in a news story, a biography novel
or film, a parody or a satire using his identity.94 On the other hand, a
person may successfully invoke the right of publicity for identification
value in an advertisement because purely commercial uses of a per-
son's identity to sell products are consistently given less First Amend-
ment protection than news reporting or artistic expression. 95 "[T]he
rule seems to be that the more commercial the form, the less it is apt
to be considered as protectable 'speech.' " 9 6 Thus, the right of public-
ity protects the identification value of a celebrity's persona against un-
authorized commercial use.
Performance value cases, on the other hand, demonstrate that the
more original, creative, and newsworthy the performance using the
plaintiff's identity, the more likely it is to be exempt from the right of
publicity.97 The court stated in Estate of Presley v. Russen:
The purpose of the portrayal in question must be examined to
determine if it predominately serves a social function valued by the
protection of free speech. If the portrayal mainly serves the pur-
pose of contributing information, which is not false or defamatory,
to the public debate of political or social issues or of providing the
free expression of creative talent which contributes to society's cul-
tural enrichment, then the portrayal generally will be immune from
liability. If, however, the portrayal functions primarily as a means
of commercial exploitation, then such immunity will not be
granted.98
Thus, the First Amendment protects performances copied for the pur-
pose of contributing valuable newsworthy information or artistic
92. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563-64 (1977).
93. See Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 968-70 (10th
Cir. 1996).
94. McCarthy, supra note 78, at 131.
95. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
96. JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTD CuLTuRE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW
229 (1991) (discussing the philosophical and cultural origin of the right of publicity and
concluding that it emerged from the capitalistic values of American society).
97. Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1356.
98. ld at 1356. The court also commented that "It]he right of publicity derived from
public prominence does not confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody and satire." Id. at
1358 (quoting concurring opinion of Bird, C.J., in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods.,
25 Cal. 3d 860, 869 (1979)). See also supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
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achievement to society, and the performances are immune from the
right of publicity.99
Although the right of publicity began at common law, today four-
teen states have statutes that codify this right.10° Eleven other states
recognize a common law right, while the remaining states have not
acknowledged the right in any form.' 0 In addition, thirteen states
recognize a post mortem right of publicity through either common law
or statutory provisions. 0 2
While the common law recognizes both performance and identifi-
cation value publicity rights for living persons, courts differ in the
treatment of the descendibility of this right to the deceased celebrity's
estate. Courts and commentators have expressed three views regard-
ing this issue: (1) The right is not descendible to the person's estate,
and therefore the identity of the person reverts to public domain sta-
tus immediately upon the person's death; (2) The right descends only
if the person exploited the right during his lifetime; and (3) The right
descends regardless of whether the person exploited the right while
alive.'0 3 At the same time, some states have enacted statutes that spe-
cifically provide for a post mortem right of publicity. 10 4
B. California Right of Publicity Statutes
While the common law protects a person's performance value in
California, California Civil Code section 3344 recognizes a person's
identification value and protects a celebrity's right of publicity. Sec-
tion 3344 makes it illegal to "knowingly use another's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products,
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, with-
out such person's prior consent."' 0 5 Consistent with the First Amend-
ment, the statute exempts the use in "connection with any news,
public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political
campaign."'16
99. This immunity is similar to the fair use defense in copyright law which provides an
exception to the prohibition on the reproduction of copyrighted works "for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research .... The Copy-
right Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107.
100. McCarthy, supra note 78, at 132.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. CARTER ET AL., supra note 73, at 203.
104. McCarthy, supra note 78, at 132. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp.
1997).
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1997).
106. Id. § 3344(d).
March 1997]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
California also codifies the post mortem right of publicity in sec-
tion 990, which makes it a tort to use "a deceased personality's name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or sell-
ing, or soliciting purchase of products, merchandise, goods, or serv-
ices, without prior consent from the person or [the estate]."'10 7 The
statute provides that the rights are "freely transferable" 08 and sets
forth the manner in which the interest in a deceased personality shall
be divided among the deceased personality's heirs if the person dies
intestate. 0 9 Additionally, "[i]f [the] deceased personality does not
transfer his or her rights [under the statute] by contract, or by means
of a trust or testamentary document, and there are no surviving" fam-
fly members, the right terminates." 0
This post mortem right terminates fifty years after the death of
the personality."' Moreover, the provision expressly exempts the use
of the deceased personality's likeness in "[a] play, book, magazine,
newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program and
material that is of political or newsworthy value.""12 Indeed, Califor-
nia's right of publicity statutes are among the most comprehensive in
the nation, protecting a celebrity's image against unauthorized com-
mercial use while maintaining an outlet for news reporting and artistic
expression." 3
C. Current Right of Publicity Cases
(1) Identification Value
Recent right of publicity cases illustrate the courts' increasing
sensitivity to celebrities' publicity rights. Today courts are taking a
hard line against unauthorized use of a person's identity for commer-
cial gain. For example, in Midler v. Ford Motor Co." n the court held
that Ford committed a tort when it used singer Bette Midler's voice
107. Id. § 990(a).
108. Id. § 990(b).
109. Id. § 990(d)(1)-(4).
110. Id. § 990(e).
111. Id. § 990(g).
112. Id. § 990(n).
113. Compare California Civil Code section 990 (California's post mortem right of
publicity), which provides protection for 50 years after the death of the celebrity, with
Virginia and Florida statutes, which extend protection for 20 and 40 years respectively.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1984), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1988).
114. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), affd on appeal after re-
mand sub nom. Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991) (mem.) cert
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
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identity to sell its cars without her permission." 5 After Midler refused
Ford's advertising offer, Ford hired a former back-up singer from
Midler's band to sing the 1973 Midler hit "Do You Want to
Dance?"" 6 as part of an advertising campaign. Ford instructed the
singer to sound as much like Midler as possible." 7 The court deter-
mined that Ford misappropriated Midler's identity and reasoned that
a "voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested."" 8
Similarly, in Onassis v. Christian Dior, the Supreme Court of New
York County held that the use of a Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis
"lookalike" in an advertisement violated the former first lady's right
of publicity." 9 The Dior Sportswear ad featured a posh wedding with
such celebrities in attendance as movie critic Gene Shalit, model Shari
Belafonte, and a secretary who looked strikingly like Onassis. 120
Although the face used in the ad did not belong to Onassis, the court
nevertheless found that Dior violated Onassis' right of publicity be-
cause the face was identifiable as Onassis.121 Although the New York
privacy statute covered only use of the plaintiff's own identity, the
court reasoned that the statute "is intended to protect the essence of
the person, his or her identity or persona from being unwillingly or
unknowingly misappropriated for the profit of another."'122 The court
c6ncluded that Dior intended to create the illusion that Onassis en-
dorsed its products.' 23
The Ninth Circuit demonstrated a commitment to protecting the
right of publicity in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'24 As
part of a humorous advertising campaign, Samsung depicted a robot,
adorned in a gown and hairstyle resembling game show hostess Vanna
White.12s While the robot turned letters on a game board, the ad
prominently displayed Samsung VCRs and a caption reading, "Long-
est-running game show. 2012 A.D.'' i 26
115. Id. at 463. The court also noted that California Civil Code § 3344 did not apply
since Midler's own voice was not used; it found a separate tort for the appropriation of
Midler's identity. Il
116. Id at 461.
117. Id
118. Id at 463.
119. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1984),
affd 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1985).
120. Id. at 257.
121. l at 263.
122. Id. at 260 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 261, 263.
124. White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
125. Id. at 1396.
126. Id.
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Although Samsung did not use White's name or exact likeness in
creating the robot, the court found that the totality of the circum-
stances-the blonde wig, style of dress, and "Wheel-of-Fortune" type
game board-raised an inference that White's persona had been ap-
propriated for commercial gain.127 "Viewed separately, the individual
aspects of the advertisement . . . say little. Viewed together, they
leave little doubt about the celebrity the ad is meant to depict."'128
Moreover, the court rejected Samsung's parody defense, reasoning
that the satirical format was outweighed by the main message: "[B]uy
Samsung VCRs."'1 29 Because the robot was identifiable as White, the
court determined that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether
Samsung violated White's right of publicity. 30
The commercial use of the likeness of a character played by a
deceased actor surfaced in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.'3' The heirs
of actor Bela Lugosi sued the defendants for unauthorized commer-
cial exploitation of Lugosi's identity in the role of Count Dracula.132
The California Supreme Court held that the right to exploit Lugosi's
name and likeness in that context did not descend to the heirs because
Lugosi did not exploit his identity for commercial gain during his life-
time.' 33 Although this case was decided prior to the enactment of
California Civil Code section 990 (establishing a post mortem right of
publicity), the holding would likely stand under the modem statute
since Lugosi assigned his publicity rights surrounding the character
"Dracula" to Universal as part of the movie deal. 34 Judge Mosk, in
his concurring opinion, distinguished between appropriating an actor's
likeness and appropriating the likeness of a character played by the
actor. 35 He reasoned that since Lugosi portrayed a classic character
from a novel, he did not own property rights to that character. 36
Therefore, he concluded that Lugosi's identity as Dracula did not de-
scend to his heirs.137
As illustrated by Midler and White, courts are expanding the right
of publicity to find misappropriation in look- and sound-alike situa-
tions as well as in circumstances in which the celebrity's exact voice or
photograph is exploited. These identification value cases reflect an
127. Id. at 1399.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1401.
130. Id.
131. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
132. Id. at 427.
133. Id. at 431. This case was decided before the California legislature established a
post mortem right of publicity in section 990.
134. Id. at 426 n.2.
135. Id. at 432 (Mosk, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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increased awareness by the courts of the importance of a celebrity's
interest in his or her identity. The right of publicity is evolving into an
effective method to protect celebrities from unauthorized exploitation
for commercial gain.
(2) Performance Value
Performance value cases are less common than identification
value claims because advertisers are more likely to use a celebrity's
name, voice or likeness without capitalizing upon an entire perform-
ance.138 Nevertheless, courts continue to recognize a celebrity's right
to the economic value of his performance. 139 Courts have been un-
sympathetic to producers who copy a celebrity's performance without
parody or creative additions that alter the performance. 140 In Estate
of Presley v. Russen,14 the United States District Court for New
Jersey enjoined the defendant from performing a stage show designed
to imitate Elvis because the performance would likely infringe upon
the Presley estate's right of publicity.142 The court found that since
Elvis had exploited his name during his lifetime the right was descend-
ible."' 3 In balancing freedom of expression against the plaintiff's
claim, the court found that the defendant's use of Presley's perform-
ance was "merely a copy" and did "not really have its own creative
component and [did] not have a significant value as pure
entertainment."' 44
Similarly, in Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber,"45 defendants presented
eight shows a week for over three years performing Beatles songs
against a multimedia background. 146 Applying Zacchini, the court rea-
soned that the unauthorized imitation constituted commercial appro-
priation of the Beatles' identity.147 Moreover, because the main
objective of the performance was to exploit the Beatles' identity, the
court determined that the appropriation outweighed any First
Amendment fair use defense, such as newsworthy content.1 8
138. See McCarthy, supra note 78, at 133.
139. See Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1339 (enjoining defendant's stage show be-
cause it would likely infringe Presley's estate's right of publicity).
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1361.
143. Id. at 1355. See also Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 445 (Byrd, Ci., dissenting) (arguing that
the right of publicity should descend to the celebrity's heirs).
144. Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1359.
145. 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986).
146. IAL at 1017.
147. Apple Corps, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 1017 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcast-
ing Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
148. Id.
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Courts, however, are less likely to find a violation of the right of
publicity when a defendant uses a celebrity's performance as part of a
biographical portrayal of the celebrity. For example, in Joplin Enter-
prises v. Allen, the court held that the defendant's two-act play depict-
ing a day in the life of deceased singer Janis Joplin, including a
concert, did not violate the plaintiff's right of publicity.149 The court
found that the defendant's use of Joplin's identity in a play was ex-
empt under California Civil Code section 990(n), which extends the
right of publicity to deceased celebrities, since the performance of the
concert in Act II was part of the protected expression of the entire
play.'5 0 Noting that cases such as Apple Corps and Estate of Presley
imply that a performance must be analyzed as a whole, the court
stated: "To analyze Act II of Janis out of context would destroy the
statutory exemption."'15 Thus, Joplin suggests that if the performance
is one aspect of a new artistic work and does not merely cash in on the
original performer's labor, courts will apply the First Amendment and
find the right of publicity inapplicable.
M. Analysis
Although no case law expressly addresses digital replication, Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 3344 arguably protects a living actor from
digital replication in a commercial or a film without his consent. Simi-
larly, California's post mortem right of publicity statute, California
Civil Code section 990, prohibits the use of a digitally resurrected ac-
tor in an advertisement without his estate's permission. This statute,
however, is inadequate to protect a deceased actor from unauthorized
use in a movie or television program because fim and television are
expressly excluded by the statute. The statute should provide the
same level of protection for deceased actors as section 3344 provides
for living actors. To this end, the California Legislature should amend
section 990 in anticipation of digital resurrection of deceased
celebrities.
A. California Law as Applied to the Digital Replication of Living Actors
In California, before an actor's "name, voice,.., photograph or
likeness" can be used to sell a commercial product, California Civil
Code section 3344 and case law dictate that the actor's permission
must be gained.'52 For the actor who has been digitally replicated to
enjoy the protection of the statute, the digital replication must fall
149. 795 F. Supp. 349, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 351 (citing Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. 1015 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1986) and Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981)).
152. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1997).
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under the definition of either a likeness or a photograph. Although
the statute does not define the term "likeness," the replicated actor is
arguably a likeness in that the digital replication is made to exactly
match the physical appearance of the living actor so as to be indistin-
guishable. Moreover, White v. Samsung Products supports this posi-
tion because the Ninth Circuit implied that a robot could infringe
Vanna White's right of publicity even though the robot was not an
exact replica of White.153
The statute does, however, define the term photograph as "any
photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any
videotape or live television transmission, of any person, such that the
person is readily identifiable."' 54 The process of rendering the com-
puter-generated actor mimics a "photographic reproduction.' 55 The
computer traces virtual "light rays" from its computer camera to the
digital character. 5 6 These rays reflect off the digital surfaces to light
sources. 157 The resulting image is photographic in every way, includ-
ing highlights, shadows, reflections, motion blur, focus and zoom. 58
Therefore, whether considered a likeness or a photograph, a com-
puter-generated actor would almost certainly be covered by the stat-
ute as long as he was readily identifiable. Furthermore, even if a court
classified the replicant as a "lookalike" and not as a photographic re-
production or likeness, cases such as Onassis v. Christian Dior 59 and
White v. Samsung Products160 illustrate that a court would likely find
the use of a replicant to sell a product a violation of that person's right
of publicity.
It is standard practice in the entertainment industry that a pro-
ducer must negotiate a fee and obtain clearance before using a photo
or film clip that bears a living actor's likeness.161 Since section 3344
does not exempt books, plays, film or magazines, a producer would
need to obtain the actor's permission prior to casting a replicated ac-
tor in a film.162 Because a court would likely classify a replicated actor
as a likeness or a photographic reproduction under section 3344, Cali-
fornia's right of publicity statute arguably protects living celebrities
from unauthorized digital replication. Nevertheless, the California
153. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
154. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344(b) (West Supp. 1997).
155. See UPSriLL, supra note 42, at 1-16 (describing the process of rendering an image
in the computer).
156. Id.
157. IL
158. Id.
159. See Onassis, 472 N.Y.S. at 254.
160. See White, 971 F.2d at 1395.
161. Interview with James Kennedy, General Counsel Electronic Arts, former General
Counsel for Industrial Light & Magic, in San Francisco, California (Feb. 13, 1996).
162. See GArIms, supra note 96, at 200.
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Legislature should strengthen section 3344 by expressly including 2-D
and 3-D digital replication in its definition of photograph. The Legis-
lature should also define the term likeness to include digital
replication.
B. California Law as Applied to the Digital Resurrection of Deceased
Actors
The digital resurrection of deceased actors will likely spark con-
cern among the heirs of celebrities. After the completion of "Rendez-
vous A 'Montreal," the estate of Humphrey Bogart notified the scien-
tists, imploring them not to use the deceased actor's likeness for ad-
vertising purposes.163 Based on California Civil Code section 990,
which prohibits the unauthorized use of a deceased person's identity
in advertising, it is illegal to use a resurrected actor to advertise a
product without the estate's permission.164 Section 990 defines "pho-
tograph" in the same manner as section 3344.165 As previously men-
tioned, the computer process used to digitally produce an actor's
image mimics photographic reproduction. Therefore, a court would
likely apply section 990's definition of "photograph" to a resurrected
actor so long as the resurrected figure was identifiable as the actor.166
Overall, however, section 990 provides less protection for de-
ceased actors than section 3344 provides for living actors. While sec-
tion 990 provides the same protection from unauthorized commercial
use as section 3344, section 990 does not protect use of a deceased
actor's identity in a film or television program. The exemption of film
and television from the right of publicity in section 990 may illustrate
the California Legislature's First Amendment concerns surrounding
the right of publicity.167 The Legislature likely wanted to insure that
images of deceased celebrities remained available for news, fictional
novels, and drama. 68 Because the potential capabilities of digital
technology have only recently surfaced, it is doubtful that the Legisla-
ture had resurrected actors in mind when it ratified the statute. Nev-
ertheless, since section 990(n) expressly allows the use of the deceased
celebrity's likeness in film and television, it appears that, immediately
163. Weigner & Schlax, supra note 54, at 274.
164. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1997).
165. Id. §§ 990(i), 3344(b).
166. But see Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call at Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection of
Deceased Entertainers-A 21st Century Challenge for Intellectual Property Law, 8 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 101, 154 (1993) (stating that a computer-generated actor is likely to be consid-
ered a "likeness" under post mortem right of publicity statutes). This article does not
advocate the application of the right of publicity to deceased actors. Id. at 146-47. Instead,
it proposes that the digital actor be protected via moral rights. Id. at 192.
167. GAINES, supra note 96, at 201.
168. Id.
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upon the actor's death, a resurrected version of the actor could be cast
in a role by any studio without permission from the estate.
However, the common law may exclude a pure performance
value use as in violation of the right of publicity. Cases such as Estate
of Presley169 and Apple Corps170 arguably prohibit a studio from using
a resurrected actor in a recreation of his original performance. If a
court determined that, like the concert in Estate of Presley, such a
portrayal contributed little to the cultural value of society and was
more commercial in nature, it would probably find that the exploita-
tion infringed upon the estate's right of publicity. On the other hand,
if the reproduced performance was merely one element in a film, Jop-
lin' 7' would likely control. In that case, the court held that it was im-
possible to separate the performance from the protected expression,
and therefore the right of publicity did not apply. 72
Thus, California's right of publicity statutes provide some protec-
tion against unauthorized digital replication and resurrection of ac-
tors. The language of section 3344 protects living celebrities from
unauthorized digital replication in commercials and arguably in mov-
ies. California's post mortem right of publicity statute, section 990,
recognizes the need for protection against unauthorized use of a de-
ceased actor's image in a commercial context but does not protect a
deceased actor from digital resurrection in film or television. Section
990's exclusion of film and television weakens the statute because of
the potential for abuse that exists with the ability to digitally resurrect
deceased actors.
C. Public Policy Reasons for Applying the Right of Publicity to the Use
of Digitally Resurrected Actors in Film
Several economic arguments favor application of section 990,
which protects a deceased celebrity's right of publicity, to the use of a
resurrected actor in film. First, if the resurrected actor falls immedi-
ately into public domain, the studio will be able to capitalize upon the
actor's reputation and audience appeal without paying the actor's es-
tate. When the actor was alive, his work and talent built his reputa-
tion and appeal. Therefore, he has an economic right in his identity
and this right should pass to the actor's estate rather than provide a
windfall to a multimillion dollar studio.173
169. Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1339.
170. Apple Corps, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 1015.
171. Joplin, 795 F. Supp. at 351-52.
172. Id.
173. See Beard, supra note 166, at 166 (acknowledging that an argument in favor of the
right of publicity is "that the financial benefits of the actor's labors in life should, in death,
go to his heirs").
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Some may argue that, since filmmaking is a collaborative process
between the actor, producer, director, and production crew, the ac-
tor's performance value and reputation are not exclusively the prod-
uct of the actor's ability.174 Proponents of this view believe that,
because the entertainment industry played a role in creating the ac-
tor's appeal, the industry should have some control over the actor's
image.175 It is often difficult, however, to separate the actor as a per-
son from the actor the public perceives through the roles the actor has
played. This argument is akin to stating that a student's intellect can
somehow be separated from the student because his teachers and par-
ents helped to develop that intellect.
In addition, allowing a studio to have free use of a resurrected
actor could diminish the actor's worth while alive. Studios may be
unwilling to pay as much for something that will eventually fall into
public domain. 76 Furthermore, as digital technology improves, it will
inevitably decrease in cost.177 In time it could become less expensive
for studios to make movies using replicated actors than to pay living
actors' salaries. This could result in loss of employment or wages for
actors, and could stifle acting as an art form.
Studios commonly market movies by licensing the rights to create
dolls of the characters, posters, t-shirts, and countless other tie-in
products. Although merchandising is not a form of artistic expression,
a standard movie contract includes the right to use the actor's identity
in marketing the film and in associated merchandise. 178 This dichot-
omy in the structure of film deals reveals a glaring flaw in section 990.
While the statute allows the likeness of a deceased actor to be used in
film without permission from the estate, the statute prohibits the un-
authorized use of the actor's likeness for commercial gain. The use of
the actor's image for merchandising is purely commercial, and it is
arguably prohibited by the statute unless the studio obtains permis-
sion from the actor's estate.179 Because it is difficult to distinguish be-
tween the part of the film deal that is artistic and that which is
commercial, the unauthorized appropriation of a digitally resurrected
actor in film should be limited.
174. Cf. GANES, supra note 96, at 85 (discussing the conflict between photographer
and subject of proprietorship over the photographic likeness of a person).
175. Id.
176. Cf Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Prop-
erty: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, 22-
23 (1985) (arguing that "inheritability of the right [of publicity does not] diminish the art-
ist's own present ability to profit from his fame").
177. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
178. MICHAEL F. MAYER, THE FILM INDUSTRmES 14 (1978).
179. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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Moreover, the protection of a deceased actor's reputation sup-
ports the application of the right of publicity to the use of a resur-
rected actor in a film. If the actor were still alive, he would be able to
choose which roles to play. As the law now stands, immediately upon
death the deceased actor falls into public domain. This creates an op-
portunity for much abuse. Consider the following scenario: a popular
actor, to preserve his reputation, turns down a leading role in a vio-
lent, erotic thriller. If the next day he is killed in an unfortunate acci-
dent, the studio would be able to use a digitally resurrected version of
the actor to star in the film immediately.180 The studio nullifies the
actor's wishes by casting him in a role he refused to perform while
alive. Furthermore, it is possible for the studio to cast the resurrected
actor in other film roles that are inconsistent with his personality, cre-
ating an entire body of work that the actor did not authorize. As a
result, future generations will form an opinion about the actor based
on the studio's portrayal and not on the actor's real personality or
ability.
Many will argue that the First Amendment should allow the film
producer to use the resurrected actor in whatever way he desires. The
California Legislature, however, can impose limits on digital resurrec-
tion without abridging the Constitution. The Legislature can limit the
manner in which an idea is expressed without restraining the idea it-
self. For example, the Legislature could prevent a movie studio from
digitally resurrecting Marilyn Monroe without permission, but the law
would still allow the studio to hire a "lookalike" actor to portray
her.18'
There is a marked distinction between a digitally resurrected ac-
tor and a living "lookalike" actor playing the deceased in a film. Be-
cause of the exacting detail that is possible with computer graphics,
the resurrected actor will be indistinguishable from the deceased. In
contrast, a "lookalike" does not match the deceased as perfectly. Ad-
ditionally, the "lookalike" is a real person who will be credited and
judged on his own acting merits. 112 Finally, freedom of expression still
allows the deceased actor to be written about in books and com-
mented on in the news.
Some may argue that a limitation on the use of resurrected actors
will frustrate the creative filmmaking process. However, limiting the
use of resurrected actors does not prevent a producer from creating
180. Cf Beard, supra note 166, at 162 (noting that there is no constitutional impedi-
ment to involuntary servitude regarding the use of a digital actor).
181. Since the use of a lookalike is not for advertising purposes, the holding of Onassis
would not prohibit its use.
182. For example, actor Martin Landau won an Academy Award for his portrayal of
the late Bela Lugosi in the film "Ed Wood." Roxanne Roberts, 'Forrest Gump, Good as
Gold Few Surprises as Blockbuster Takes Top Honors, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1995, at El.
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unique computer-generated characters with personalities of their own
and casting them in movies. This process is arguably more creative
than replicating a deceased person's personality. Finally, limitations
on the use of resurrected actors does not imply that they will not be
used. It will, however, require that they be used in a manner consis-
tent with the actor's wishes or those of his estate and that the estate be
compensated.
D. A Licensing System in the Hands of the Estate
These public policy arguments support putting the decision to
create the resurrected actor in the hands of the actor himself or his
estate. If the right of publicity applied to the use of digitally resur-
rected actors, a studio that desired to use the actor in a movie or tele-
vision program would have to gain permission from the estate. This
permission could be set up through a licensing system whereby a stu-
dio would purchase the right to use the actor's identity from the actor
while alive, or from his estate after death. Actors could specify the
terms of the license in their wills. If an actor did not provide for digi-
tal resurrection in his will, the responsibility would pass to his estate.
The license could stipulate the types of roles the actor would be will-
ing to play and/or the compensation due. The estate's involvement
through such a system could help to create a resurrected actor that
contributes to artistic expression, while simultaneously preserving the
actor's reputation and final wishes.
(1) Arguments Against a Licensing System
Professor Joseph Beard, in his article, Casting Call at Forest
Lawn,183 raises several arguments against granting the estate the right
to license a deceased actor's identity. First, he contends that the li-
censing approach may frustrate the ability of producers to obtain the
best quality resurrected actors at the most affordable price.' How-
ever, if the actor's identity falls immediately into public domain, stu-
dios will likely produce a few high quality resurrections and a myriad
of low quality performances. If the identity of a deceased celebrity is
freely available, many studios will attempt resurrection with inferior
technology in order to profit. A licensing structure would foster high
quality performances because the studio will have to protect its mone-
tary investment by striving for a high-quality product; the studio will
have to come to an agreement with the estate regarding such details as
the type of film roles the resurrected actor will play.
183. Beard, supra note 166, at 165.
184. Id.
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Beard further contends that licensing could make the process so
lengthy that many older people may not be able to see resurrected
actors in their lifetime, and these people would be the people most
likely to remember the actor when he was alive.' 8 5 However, these
would also be the people most disappointed by a poor resurrection
and most offended by a performance inconsistent with the actor's rep-
utation. A licensing system provides the best mechanism for a studio
to produce a performance that is consistent with the actor's reputation
and acting ability.
Next, Beard argues that a licensing system may result in a refusal
by the estate to license any rights to use the actor, "or demand such
unrealistic fees that no producer would be willing to buy;" as a result,
few deceased celebrities would be digitally resurrected. 8 6 However,
the free market system operates in such a manner that living actors
who are in high demand can charge higher prices than those in lower
demand. There is no reason to assume that this principle should not
hold for resurrected actors. Estates asking more than producers are
willing to pay will likely lower their fees in order to negotiate a deal.
Finally, Beard implies that licensing may impede competition by al-
lowing an estate to negotiate an exclusive deal with one producer or
studio. 87 However, competition would be no more stifled than it is
with living actors who are currently able to negotiate similar exclusive
licenses. Moreover, an exclusive deal might be desirable. The studio
would have a vested long-term interest in casting the resurrected actor
in roles consistent with the late actor's reputation.
Thus, a statutory extension of the post mortem right of publicity
would foster a licensing system in the hands of the estate. This system
would allow the actor or his estate to decide whether the actor should
be digitally resurrected. Studios would be required to purchase a li-
cense from the actor or his estate. The license would set forth the
digital actor's film roles and compensation due. This system would
result in high quality digital resurrection that is consistent with the
actor's reputation.
(2) An Alternative to the Proposed Licensing System
Those who oppose a licensing system controlled by the actor's
estate suggest a compromise between actors and the entertainment
industry. 88 For example, Pamela Kunath recommends a compulsory
185. Id.
186. Id at 165-66.
187. Id at 166.
188. See Pamela L. Kunath, Note, Lights, Camera, Animate! The Right of Publicity's
Effect on Computer-Animated Celebrities, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 863, 903 (1996) (arguing
against the application of the right of publicity and advocating a compulsory licensing
scheme).
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licensing system for the use of digitally resurrected actors in film in
her Note, Lights, Camera, Animate! The Right of Publicity's Effect on
Computer-Animated Celebrities.189 Kunath's proposal would require
both living and deceased celebrities to license their likenesses on a per
use basis to some of those who request it in exchange for a "statutorily
determined" compensation figure.190 Kunath also suggests that celeb-
rities be required by statute to accept a minimum number of
requests.191
While this compulsory licensing system does compensate a celeb-
rity's estate, it does not address the potential for a filmmaker to dam-
age a deceased personality's reputation. Although Kunath's
suggestion of a "statutory minimum requirement of acceptances"' 192
implies that a celebrity would not need to accept every request, it
would not prevent exploitation of a deceased celebrity. In fact, stu-
dios could use a compulsory licensing system to manipulate an actor's
estate into licensing the image of the actor for use in an undesirable
role. For example, if a celebrity's estate was required to accept twenty
requests per year, a studio could submit an undesirable request at the
end of the year. If the estate had not already accepted twenty re-
quests, it would be forced to license the likeness regardless of the film-
maker's intended use.
Moreover, the likenesses of less popular personalities would be
especially vulnerable. The statutory minimum requirement may leave
these estates without recourse against numerous exploitative requests
if they receive no favorable requests during the statutory period.
Thus, neither Professor Beard's anti-licensing approach nor Kunath's
compulsory licensing system protects a deceased celebrity's reputa-
tion. By contrast, a statutory revision to the right of publicity would
compensate the estate while simultaneously protecting celebrities'
reputations.
IV. An Exception to California Civil Code Section 990(n)
Although section 990 prevents the unauthorized use of a de-
ceased actor's identity to sell commercial products, it fails to recognize
the potential problems digital resurrection presents. Digital resurrec-
tion creates unlimited potential for filmmakers to damage an actor's
reputation and uncontroverted possibilities for a studio to gain a fi-
nancial windfall from unauthorized exploitation of a deceased actor's
189. Unlike a licensing system in the hands of the actor or his estate, a compulsory
licensing system would require the actor or his estate to license his identity for use in a
movie or television program. See id at 904.
190. Id. at 904.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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labor. Moreover, the structure of a film deal reveals a weakness in
section 990. While section 990(n) exempts film from the right of pub-
licity, section 990(a) applies the right of publicity to commercial uses.
A typical film deal dictates that the actor's likeness may be used to
create tie-in products relating to the movie. Because tie-in products
that use an actor's likeness are commercial, they are arguably prohib-
ited without permission from the estate. Thus, the film deal circum-
vents the statute's general prohibition on unauthorized use of the
deceased personality's identity for commercial gain.
Based on these policy reasons, the right of publicity should exist
for the use of a resurrected actor in a film or television program. The
California Legislature should, therefore, redraft Civil Code section
990 to include this protection. 193 To create a version of the statute
that would protect the resurrected actor, the Legislature should begin
by defining the term "likeness" to include digitally recreated actors.
Although the Legislature defines the term photograph in section
990(i), it fails to define "likeness" in either section 990 or 3344.194 As
noted earlier, a resurrected actor arguably falls under the definition of
photograph. However, the Legislature can fashion a more effective
version of the statute by defining likeness to include 2-D and or 3-D
computer-generated versions of a person that are readily identifiable
as that person.
In addition, the Legislature should amend the exemption of film
and television in section 990(n). It should extend the right of publicity
to the use of 2-D and 3-D digitally reproduced actors in film and tele-
vision programs. It should specify that digital replication requires per-
mission from the estate.195 Furthermore, the Legislature should set a
specified time limit on this exclusion to allow the deceased personal-
193. Some commentators argue that because of the disparity among states in the treat-
ment of the right of publicity a federal statute should be enacted. See J. Eugene Salomon,
Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L.
RE-V. 1179, 1204 (1987) (proposing a federal right of publicity statute which provides for
survivability); McCarthy, supra note 78, at 141 (noting that the International Trademark
Association has inquired into sponsoring the legislation of a federal right of publicity stat-
ute). Without a federal statute in place, the best solution is to provide for protection at the
state level. California is the most appropriate place to begin since it is the entertainment
capital. Moreover, if California leads the way in protecting the publicity rights of actors
who are digitally resurrected and used in film, a federal statute may be more likely to
incorporate such protection.
194. Although section 3344 likely protects living celebrities from unauthorized digital
replication in commercials and in film, the California legislature should expressly include
2-D and 3-D digital replication in its definition of photograph in section 3344. Moreover,
the legislature should define likeness in section 3344 to include digital replication. To
strengthen section 3344, the legislature could adopt the definitions of photograph and like-
ness in this Note's proposed amended section 990. See supra Part IV.A of this Note.
195. This permission could be established through a licensing system in the hands of
the actor's estate. See supra Part ILI.D of this Note.
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ity's identity to eventually fall into public domain. Fifty years after the
death of the actor would be appropriate, since it would bring the time
limit in line with the statute's prohibition on the use of a deceased
person's likeness for advertising purposes. 196
Additionally, to provide for freedom of expression, the exception
should include a fair use provision, similar to the Copyright Act,197 to
allow digital resurrection without the estate's permission under cer-
tain circumstances. 198 For example, this provision should allow a pro-
ducer to create a computer-generated version of a classic character
such as Dracula or Frankenstein for use in film, without permission
from the estate of an actor who played the character during his life-
time. 99 The statute should also allow a producer to create an obvi-
ously exaggerated digital caricature of a deceased actor for use in
parody or satire.200 This would encourage political commentary and
creative expression that the First Amendment so rightly protects.
Since it is not possible to effectively provide for every situation
that may arise in a statute, the Legislature should include factors in
the fair use provision that courts may consider when evaluating a par-
ticular case. The fair use provision should direct courts to take a bal-
ancing approach, similar to that stated in Estate of Presley,20' which
weighs freedom of expression and the right of publicity when deciding
cases. For example, a studio might be allowed to digitally resurrect an
actor who dies during the filming process, as in the movie "The
Crow. '202 The studio, however, may be limited to using the resur-
rected actor to finish the movie that he was under contract to com-
plete. The role the actor plays should not deviate from the original
script and character role the actor agreed to play, and the actor's sal-
ary could be paid to his estate. Thus, amended section 990 would de-
fine the terms "likeness" and "photograph" to include digital actors,
extend the right of publicity to digitally resurrected actors used in film
and television programs, and provide a fair use provision that allows
digital resurrection without permission under certain circumstances.
196. The legislature will need to determine the exact length of time based on argu-
ments made by special interest groups.
197. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
198. The concept of fair use allows courts to protect culturally contributive perform-
ances while excluding economically exploitative performances. See Apple Corps Ltd., 229
U.S.P.Q. at 1017. See also supra note 99 and accompanying text.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 131-37.
200. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
201. See Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1356.
202. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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A. A Proposal for Amending Section 990
As noted, California Civil Code section 990 provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products,
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services,
without prior consent from the person or persons specified in subdi-
vision (c), shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or
persons injured as a result thereof.
(n) This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased per-
sonality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of
the following instances:
(1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition,
film, radio or television program, other than an advertisement or
commercial announcement not exempt under paragraph (4).203
The California Legislature could amend section 990 to encompass
digital personality reproduction as follows:
Section 990(a)'s general prohibition would remain without
change.
(a)(1) As used in this section, "likeness" means any reproduc-
tion of a personality in which the deceased personality is readily
identifiable from a visual image or audio simulation. Audio simula-
tion includes any audio performance which is indistinguishable from
the personality's voice by a reasonable person. Visual image in-
cludes, but is not limited to, 2-D, 3-D and photographic reproduc-
tions. A deceased personality shall be deemed readily identifiable
from the likeness when one who views the likeness with the naked
eye can reasonably determine who the person depicted in the like-
ness is.2°4
(n) This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased per-
sonality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of
the following instances:
(1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition,
radio program, film or television program not exempt under para-
graph (i), other than an advertisement or commercial announce-
ment not exempt under paragraph (4).
(i) The exemption in paragraph (n)(1) shall not apply to
the use of a deceased personality as a 2-D or 3-D digitally re-
produced personality for use in film or television programs
without the consent of the person prior to death or the consent
of the person's estate. No action shall be brought under this
section by reason of any use of a digitally reproduced personal-
203. CAL. CV. CODE § 990.
204. See id § 990(i) (defining "readily identifiable" in the context of a photograph).
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ity occurring after the expiration of 50 years from the death of
the deceased personality.205
(ii) As used in this section, "2-D" digital reproduction
means alteration of a photograph or film image of the deceased
personality by computer or similar means, so as to create a new
performance.
(iii) As used in this section, "3-D" digital reproduction
means the creation of an exact or near-exact, three dimensional
replica of the personality by computer or similar means, so as
to create a new performance.
(iv) Fair Use of Digitally Reproduced Personalities20 6
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (i), the
fair use of a 2-D or 3-D digitally reproduced personality
for purposes such as parody, satire, historical or biographi-
cal portrayal is not an infringement of the right of public-
ity. In determining whether the use of a 2-D or 3-D
digitally reproduced personality in a particular case is a
fair use the following factors should be considered:
(1) Whether the digital reproduction is of a personal-
ity or of a well-known fictional character the deceased per-
sonality portrayed while alive.
(2) Whether the digital reproduction is made in order
to complete a film or television program in which the de-
ceased personality contracted to perform prior to death.
Such use shall be limited to the express terms of the con-
tract and the personality's estate shall be compensated for
the use.
(3) The extent to which the digital personality is used
in relation to the work as a whole, including whether a fa-
mous performance or scene of a classic film is inserted into
an otherwise original work.
(4) The extent to which the digital portrayal com-
municates newsworthy occurrences, including reenactment
of historical events as documented.
(5) The extent to which a personality's likeness is
used to create a new, unique digital character that is not an
exact replica of the personality at any age during his
lifetime.
Conclusion
Digital artists are on the brink of creating exact replicas of living
and deceased actors.20 7 This capability presents new possibilities for
205. This language is taken from section 990(g) which states that after 50 years a de-
ceased personality falls into public domain for commercial purposes. Id § 990(g).
206. This proposed fair use provision is based on the Copyright Act's fair use provi-
sion, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996).
207. See supra Part I.
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creative expression, but it is not without dangers. 20 A studio could
exploit a living actor's talent for commercial gain. A producer could
diminish a deceased personality's reputation by creating an inaccurate
portrayal of the actor. As we are warned in the tale of "Franken-
stein," the capacity to create life, even the illusion of life, is so power-
ful that it has the potential to cause damage and injury if left
ungoverned. 209
The California Legislature should respond proactively before
fully believable digital actors become a reality. The right of publicity
is widely recognized through the common law and statutory provi-
sions210 and should be used to protect the identity of actors from ex-
ploitation. Today, California law prohibits the exploitation of a
likeness of a living or deceased actor for advertising purposes, and
arguably protects living actors from digital replication.211 To round
out the protections, the deceased actor must be insured against unau-
thorized digital resurrection. To this end, the Legislature should re-
draft California Civil Code section 990 to include right of publicity
protection for deceased actors who are digitally resurrected and used
in film and television programs. 212
208. See supra Part III.C.
209. See supra note 1.
210. See supra Part II.
211. See supra Part HI.A-B.
212. See supra Part IV, which outlines the suggested provisions for a version of Califor-
nia Civil Code section 990 which would prohibit the use of digitally resurrected actors in
film without permission from the actor or his estate.
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